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I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM AND
DEVELOPING A SOLUTION
The deadliest terrorist attack in history' began at 8:46 a.m. on September 11,
2001 when American Airlines Flight 1 I crashed into the World Trade Center's
North Tower.2 The force of the Boeing 767' caused severe damage to the
North Tower and trapped civilians both above and below the impact zone.
First responders arrived at the scene within minutes5 and by 8:57 a.m., the New
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See generally OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 10,940, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, at 1-2 (2002), at
http:/www. state.gov/documents/organization/ 10319.pdf (providing an overview of terror-
ism throughout the world).
2 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COM-
MISSION REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES 7 (W.W. Norton and Co. Authorized ed. 2004) [hereinafter THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. At the time, many first responders and even civilians located
inside the North Tower did not realize a commercial airplane had crashed into the building.
id. at 285-86.
3 Id. at 4. The plane carried up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel which caused a fireball
upon impact with the North Tower. Id. at 4, 285.
4 Id. at 286. The plane impacted floors ninety-three to ninety-nine of the North Tower.
Id. Exit routes were obstructed and those persons present above the ninety-second floor had
no way to evacuate the building. Id. at 285-86.
5 Those responding to the scene included members of the Fire Department of New
York, the Port Authority Police Department, the New York Police Department, and the Of-
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York Fire Department ("FDNY") had determined that people in the North
Tower should immediately evacuate the premises.' FDNY did not relay this
message to 911 emergency call system operators or FDNY dispatchers.' Many
civilians trapped in the North Tower dialed 911 seeking guidance on evacua-
tion routes and plans.' Consequently, the 911 system buckled under the high
call volume and an "all circuits busy" message greeted some of the callers.'
Other civilians within the North Tower who successfully connected to emer-
gency system operators were instructed to remain in place and await rescue
personnel." After the plane crashed into the North Tower on September 11,
the building's public address system failed in multiple locations thereby limit-
ing the ability to relay evacuation messages to individuals located within the
World Trade Center." Many people below the impact zone would eventually
perish as they waited for the arrival of rescue teams as instructed by 911 opera-
tors. 2
The system designed to alert Americans in the event of a national emer-
gency, the Emergency Alert System ("EAS") 3, was not activated on Septem-
ber 11.14 The system relies predominantly on radio and television transmis-
fice of Emergency Management and Interagency Preparedness. Id. at 281-85.
6 Id. at 287.
7 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 287.
8 Id. at 286.
9 Id.
I( Id. at 286-87. Some civilians awaited rescue assistance while others continued to
work or gather personal belongings. Id. FDNY, the New York Police Department, and the
Port Authority Police Department improvised a rescue strategy and demonstrated tremen-
dous heroism in the process. See id. at 305-9.
11 Id. at 286. Judge Richard Posner cites educating building occupants of evacuation
plans as a needed reform. He opines that this simplest of recommendations has lagged in the
aftermath of September 11. See Richard A. Posner, The 9/11 Report: A Dissent, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2004, §7 (Book Review), at 1.
12 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 296.
13 In addition to the EAS, the United States government maintains other public warning
mechanisms. For a list of these systems, see SUBCOMM. ON NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION,
NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS app. 3, at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rr/ndis rev oct27.pdf (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter EFFECTIVE DISAS-
TER WARNINGS]. The newest federal public advisory system is the Homeland Security Advi-
sory System maintained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. See Directive on the
Homeland Security Advisory System, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 394 (Mar. 11, 2002)
(establishing the Homeland Security Advisory System). States and localities also maintain
their own systems designed to warn the public. For example, Arlington County, Virginia has
implemented a system that delivers text alerts to citizens' cell phones and e-mail accounts.
See Annie Gowen, AM Station Developed For a Crisis, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2004, at C4.
The county is also developing a dedicated AM radio station to deliver emergency informa-
tion. See id.; see also Dist. of Columbia Emergency Mgmt. Agency, at http://alert.dc.gov
(last visited Feb. 16, 2005) (permitting residents to enroll in a program where citizens are
contacted via cell phones or landline telephones in the event of an emergency).
14 See Bill McConnell, This Is Not a Test, BROAD. & CABLE, Aug. 16, 2004, at 34. The
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sions,"s and was inadequately structured to effectively communicate an evacua-
tion order to the building's occupants. 6 Lives would have been saved on Sep-
tember 11 if regulators had periodically updated the EAS by integrating tech-
nological advances, such as mobile text messaging capabilities, into the sys-
tem. 7
An effective public warning mechanism plays a vital role in preserving lives
and property during all stages of a disaster by informing the public of precau-
tionary measures that should be taken. 8 Some commentators have criticized
World Trade Center hosted several television antennas atop the North Tower. Id. Ulti-
mately, the placement of these towers would have affected the capabilities of the EAS on
September 11 had the system been activated. Id. Shortly after September 11, the FCC, re-
sponding to a request by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, suspended all re-
quired EAS testing in order to "avoid potential public confusion or fear..." EAS Routine
Testing, Public Notice, 16 FCC Rcd. 16,811 (2001). In the aftermath of September 11,
President Bush signed legislation creating the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States ("9/11 Commission") to investigate the attacks and suggest future
preventative measures. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-306, tit. VI, 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-14. The creation of the 9/11 Commission involved
heated political debates and discussions. See David Firestone, White House Gives Way On a
Sept. 11 Commission; Congress Is Set to Create It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A19. In
July 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its final report listing recommendations from gov-
ernment restructuring to foreign policy approaches. See Linton Weeks, 9/11 Report Avail-
able Today Amid High Demand, WASH. POST, July 22, 2004, at C7; see also THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 361-428. While the 9/11 Commission devoted an
entire chapter detailing emergency responses to September 11, the commission produced
few recommendations regarding emergency communications systems. See id at 278-323.
The report altogether neglected to mention the nation's public warning system, the EAS. See
id. at 396-97.
15 P'SHIP FOR PUB. WARNING, PPW REPORT 2004-1, THE EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM
(EAS): AN ASSESSMENT 7, at http://www.partnershipforpublicwarning.org/ppw/docs/e-
assessment.pdf (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT]. Entities may voluntarily
participate in a national level EAS message upon receiving approval from the FCC. Emer-
gency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. §11.43 (2004). Regulations require that all AM and
FM radio broadcast and television broadcast stations as well as cable systems participate in
the national EAS. Id. §11.41(a). These entities may opt-out of the system by submitting a
written request to the FCC. Id. § 11.41(b). Broadcasters and cable systems have the discre-
tion to determine whether to carry a regional, statewide, or local message which utilizes
EAS channels. Id. § 11.41(b)(2).
16 See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 7. In the event of a catastrophic event
damaging electrical grids and other critical infrastructures, the EAS would benefit by having
a broad range of technologies incorporated into the system. Rather than relying on a handful
of methods to communicate with the public, this disbursement of methods to send messages
would increase the possibility that endangered persons receive an emergency communica-
tion. See id at 28-30.
17 Technology currently exists to send messages to all cellular telephone users physi-
cally located within the range of a cell site. See Cellular Emergency Alert Sys. Ass'n, at
http://www.ceasa.us (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
18 PUB. COMMUNICATIONS & SAFETY WORKING GROUP, MEDIA SEC. AND RELIABILITY
COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT 27, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
244523A1.doc (Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter MSRC: FINAL REPORT]. Merely communicating
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the EAS as a Cold War relic'9 and questioned whether the system should be
maintained on a national level.2" This Comment argues that the EAS should be
upgraded.2 The current system provides an existing architecture that can be
modernized with minimal effort and utilized by emergency response personnel
to communicate directly with an at-risk population.
In the aftermath of September 11, regulators must integrate current tech-
nologies into the EAS in order to efficiently disseminate emergency communi-
cations to the public.22 The proliferation of communications technologies and
media outlets over the past several decades has resulted in a fragmentation of
audiences.23 People no longer rely solely on broadcast television and radio, the
primary sources for EAS messages, for news and information.24 Instead, the
Internet, cellular telephony, and satellite communications have captured a
growing piece of the public's attention.25 Responding to this evolving land-
scape, regulators must redesign the EAS to reach an at-risk populace. Specifi-
cally, the EAS must embrace new technologies and emerge as a system that
could, for example, send text messages to cell phones and other wireless de-
a relevant emergency message to the public is only part of the job. To achieve maximum
effectiveness, the message should be, among other things, brief, accurate, and relevant. See
EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 9. For background information on the
Effective Disaster Warnings report, see Jeffrey Silva, Emergency Alert Report May Not Be
Released Until After Election, RADIO COMMUNICATIONS REPORT, Oct. 30, 2000, at 1.
'9 McConnell, supra note 14, at 1, 34. Michael Powell, Chairman of the FCC, has com-
mented that the EAS is in "disarray and needs major reform." Id. at 1.
20 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,783-84, para. 24 (2004).
21 The Partnership for Public Warning has undertaken an extensive study of the EAS
and advocates further coordination and upgrading of the system rather than abandonment.
See P'SHIP FOR PUB. WARNING, PPW REPORT 2002-02, DEVELOPING A UNIFIED ALL-HAZARD
PUBLIC WARNING SYSTEM 30, at http://www.partnershipforpublicwarning.org/p-
w/docs/11 25 2002report.pdf (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter PPW: DEVELOPING A UNIFIED
ALL-HAZARD PUBLIC WARNING SYSTEM].
22 Review of the Emergency Alert System, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,843, 52,844 (proposed Aug.
30, 2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 11). Responding to the tragedy of September 11,
the FCC has taken the lead in the effort to rework the EAS. Id.; see also Press Release, Fed-
eral Communications Commission, Commission Seeks Comment on Rule Changes for the
Emergency Alert System, Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-250534A2.pdf (Aug. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter FCC Seeks Comment on Rule Changes for the Emergency Alert System] (ac-
knowledging the changing security threat to the homeland).
23 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ECON. & STATISTICS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 720 tbl. 1125 (123d ed. 2003) [here-
inafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003].
24 See id. The number of hours people dedicate to broadcast television has steadily de-
clined over the years while the number of cable and satellite television subscribers have
steadily increased. See id. The number of hours Americans spend listening to radio has un-
dergone a steady increase. See id Internet usage has increased dramatically. See id.
25 See id.
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vices within a targeted geographic area 6.2  The manner in which such techno-
logical advances should be adopted presents only one piece of the puzzle fac-
ing the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") and
other federal regulators responsible for administering the EAS.
27 The EAS in
its current state is uncoordinated and the proper level of interaction among fed-
eral, state, and local officials must improve in order to ensure that the public
receives timely warning messages." This Comment focuses on three primary
obstacles the United States must overcome in order to increase the effective-
ness of the EAS: (1) defining the roles and responsibilities among EAS partici-
pants;29 (2) integrating and regulating technological advances into the existing
infrastructure;" and (3) educating the public and system participants." In addi-
tion, this Comment will analyze the work undertaken in both the United States
and the United Kingdom to determine how to overcome the obstacles facing
the EAS.
This Comment, in Part 1I, will relay a brief history of the EAS and provide
an overview of the system's administration. Part III examines organizational
obstacles currently facing the administration of the EAS. Part IV analyzes the
FCC's regulatory power to implement technological changes and discusses
potential methods that may be instituted to inform large numbers of people
affected by an emergency situation. Part V discusses the role of educating the
public and administrators of the EAS.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EAS: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
PUBLIC WARNING SYSTEM
The EAS's predecessors were conceptualized as a mechanism for allowing
the President to communicate directly with the American public in the event of
an imminent nuclear attack. 2 The system has never been utilized for this pur-
pose.33 Despite the end of the Cold War over a decade ago and the nature of
26 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,787-88, para. 32 (2004).
27 Id. at 15,782-83, para. 22.
28 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16-17.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 18.
31 Id. at8.
32 Exec. Order No. 10,312, 3 C.F.R. 841 (1949-1953); Exec. Order No. 11,092, 3 C.F.R.
733 (1959-1963).
33 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Red. 15,775, 15,783-84, para. 24 (2004). The EAS was not activated on September 11.
While several broadcast antennas from New York television stations sat atop the World
Trade Center, emergency personnel failed to trigger the system. McConnell, supra note 14,
at 34. The White House also did not issue a national level alert on September 11. Id.; see
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evolving threats currently facing America, the EAS has largely retained the
same structure and mission to meet this original mandate.34
In 1951, President Truman delegated authority to the FCC " to establish a
plan to prevent guided missiles or other threats from utilizing radio transmis-
sions as navigational devices.36 The FCC, working in conjunction with the
Civil Aeronautics Administration,37 developed a system known as Control of
Electromagnetic Radiation ("CONELRAD") that would minimize electromag-
netic transmissions from AM radio stations during an attack upon the United
States.38 Under CONELRAD, several designated radio stations would remain
on-air during a national emergency39 and switch their broadcast transmissions
on and off to avoid detection by enemy tracking devices.4 ° In addition, these
stations would alert other stations to cease broadcasting.'
CONELRAD also served as the nation's first public warning system.42 In
addition to establishing a means for broadcasters to provide the public with
crucial information during a national emergency, the system also established
an infrastructure by which the President could directly address the American
public during a crisis. 3  By the early 1960s, CONELRAD had become obso-
lete due to improved missile guidance and navigational technologies.'
Nevertheless, President Kennedy wanted the ability to communicate with
also Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Alert System's Deafening Silence, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec.
8, 2003, at 24.
34 See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2004). EAS origination points,
known as Primary Entry Points, are designated based on susceptibility to nuclear blasts. See
infra text accompanying note 64.
3' See Exec. Order No. 10,312, 3 C.F.R. at 841. The President derived this power from
the Communications Act of 1934 which explicitly authorized the suspension of "electro-
magnetic radiations" during a national emergency or in the interest of national security.
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §606(c) (2000).
36 See Exec. Order No. 10,312, 3 C.F.R. at 841.
37 Aviation Radio Services, 19 Fed. Reg. 1186, 1186-87 (Mar. 3, 1954) (codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 9 (1955)).
38 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,776-77, para. 6.
39 Id.
40 The stations would oscillate between 640 kHz or 1240 kHz in an effort to deceive
tracking devices. Id. These stations monitored a dedicated circuit, known as the Emergency
Action Notification Network. PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 13. This circuit
would inform the stations of an impending attack. The Emergency Action Notification Net-
work ceased to exist in 1995. Id.
41 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,776-77, para. 6;
PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 13.
42 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,776-77, para. 6.; see
also Aviation Radio Services, 19 Fed. Reg. at 1186-87 (documenting the FCC's effort to
seek comments on regulations establishing CONELRAD).
43 Aviation Radio Services, 19 Fed. Reg. at 1186-87.
44 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, app. C, at 38.
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the American public in the event of an emergency45 . In 1963, he issued an Ex-
ecutive Order requiring the FCC to develop a nationwide telecommunications
emergency preparedness plan.46 The FCC developed the Emergency Broadcast
System ("EBS") to replace CONELRAD.47 The EBS retained CONELRAD's
distribution network among radio and television stations but allowed all broad-
casters to continue transmissions during a national emergency.48 During im-
plementation of the EBS, the FCC required broadcasters to purchase and install
specialized equipment able to decode EBS messages. 9 The system also utilized
the CONELRAD technique of turning broadcast transmissions on and off to
activate the EBS equipment." In the mid-1970's, the FCC replaced the
CONELRAD signaling technique with the familiar two-tone alerting signal.'
Not only did this tone serve to activate the EBS receivers, but it also alerted the
public of a pending warning message. 2 In 1992, Congress expanded the reach
45 Id.
46 Exec. Order No. 11,092, 3 C.F.R. 733 (1959-1963). Executive Order 11,092 also
created the National Industry Advisory Committee to advise the FCC on duties related to
emergency preparedness. Id. The National Industry Advisory Committee exists today as the
Media Security and Reliability Council. See Press Release, Federal Communications Com-
mission, FCC Announces Creation of Media Security & Reliability Council; Tribune Com-
pany President Dennis FitzSimons To Be Chairman, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mis-
cellaneous/NewsReleases/2002/nrmcO2O6.pdf (Mar. 28, 2002). On May 26, 2004, the
Commission rechartered the group as the Media Security and Reliability Council II. See
Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Communications Commis-
sion Announces Recharter of Media Security and Reliability Council; Initial Meeting Under
New Charter to be Held June 2, at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-
247617Al.pdf (May 26, 2004). The Media Security and Reliability Council II has the same
mandate as its predecessor but is composed of different members of the telecommunications
industry. See id.; see also Media Security and Reliability Council, at
http://www.mediasecurity.org/mem-ers/msrccharter.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005) (detail-
ing the group's mandate and responsibilities).
47 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, app. C, at 38. A program known as the
Broadcast Station Protection Program ("BSPP") was established at the same time to ensure
broadcasters could remain on-air after a nuclear attack. Id. at 38-39. Through the BSPP,
crucial broadcast facilities were supplied with power generators, fuel, and other emergency
supplies. Id.
48 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,777, para. 7 (2004).
49 Id.
50 Id.
5' See In re Amendment of Section 73.906 of the Commission's Rules to Substitute a
Two-Tone Attention Signal for the Carrier-Break and 1,000 HZ Signal Presently in Use,
Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1160 (1974). These two audio signals were composed of 853 and 960
Hz frequencies that modulated for no longer than 25 seconds. ld app. at 1161.
52 In re Amendment of Parts 1, 2, 15, and 73 of the Commission's Rules to Provide
Equipment Type Acceptance and Certification for Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)
Attention Signal Equipment, and Exempting 10-Watt Noncommercial Educational FM
Broadcast Licensees from the Attention Signal Transmission Requirement, Report and Or-
der, 54 F.C.C.2d 868, 870, para. 7 (1975).
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of the EBS by enacting the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act.53 The Act required cable companies to transmit national level EBS
messages for the first time. 4
By 1994, the FCC instituted rules replacing the analog-based EBS with a
digitally-structured EAS 5 In addition to the adoption of a digital architecture
for the EAS, the Commission also embraced a messaging protocol,56 developed
by the National Weather Service ("NWS"), as its signaling technique.57 The
NWS utilizes this protocol to disseminate weather related information to spe-
cialized radio units, known as National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion ("NOAA") Weather Radios, which are available for purchase by the gen-
eral public. 8 As a result, EAS receivers, which are typically owned by indus-
try entities, such as radio and television broadcasters, and NOAA Weather Ra-
dios became interoperable, thus expanding the reach of the system. 9
A. Delivering a Message via the EAS: How the System Functions
Despite the many technological advances and name changes, the United
States' public warning mechanism has retained the same primary purpose since
its inception: to communicate an emergency message on a nationwide scale.6"
53 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.
§§521-555 (2000).
54 Id. §544(g). This legislation authorized the FCC to promulgate rules requiring cable
systems' participation in EAS. Id. The FCC implemented this legislation in 1994. In the
same Report and Order, the FCC mandated a switch from the analog EBS to a digital EAS.
See In re Amendment of Part 73, Subpart G, of the Commission's Rules Regarding the
Emergency Broadcast System, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 10 FCC Rcd. 1786, 1788, para. 1 (1994). The FCC initially determined that it did not
have the power under the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate cable television services.
See In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, Report and Order, 26
F.C.C. 403 (1959). Over time, the Commission gradually expanded its regulatory power
over cable systems and the Supreme Court upheld that expansion. See generally United
States v. S.W. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164-67 (1968) (providing a background of the
FCC's gradual regulation of cable television systems).
55 See In re Amendment of Part 73, Subpart G, of the Commission's Rules Regarding
the Emergency Broadcast System, 10 FCC Rcd. at 1788, para. 1.
56 The protocol is named Specific Area Message Encoding, or SAME. PPW: EAS As-
SESSMENT, supra note 15, at 18.
57 Id. at 18. NWS may activate all NOAA Weather Radios situated within a geographic
area. Using the SAME protocol, NWS may send specialized information to NOAA Weather
Radios relevant to a specific geographic area. In re Review of the Emergency Alert System,
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,780 n.25 (2004).
58 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,780 n.25.
59 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 18.
60 Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2004). All national-level warnings
preempt state or local EAS alerts that may be in progress. Id. § 11.44(a). The EAS was ini-
tially developed as a system to communicate in the event of a nuclear attack. See infra text
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Notably, the EAS has never been activated for this purpose." Nevertheless,
the EAS has demonstrated great success in delivering localized weather warn-
ings and missing child alerts through an initiative known as America's Miss-
ing: Broadcast Emergency Response ("AMBER Alerts").
62
The EAS consists of a hierarchical network of message distribution.
63 For
national messages, the system relies on thirty-four broadcast entities desig-
nated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA")4 as Primary
Entry Points.65 In the event of a national emergency, the White House contacts
FEMA which in turn delivers a message to each of the Primary Entry Points.
66
Other participants in the EAS constantly monitor these Primary Entry Points.
67
Once the Primary Entry Points receive a national EAS message, equipment
within the hierarchal chain is automatically activated and the message is dis-
tributed to the American public through this interconnected network.
6"
State and local communities are also permitted to utilize the capabilities of
the EAS for more targeted emergency alerts69 once they have developed an
FCC-approved EAS State or Local Area Plan.7" This plan designates one sta-
tion within the EAS Local Area7' as a Local Primary One ("LP-1").72 The LP- 1
accompanying note 64.
61 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 9.
62 Id. at 27.
63 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,780-81, para. 16.
64 FEMA designates Primary Entry Point stations in relation to "predicted nuclear blast
overpressure zones." PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 13.
65 "The [Primary Entry Point] system is a nationwide network of broadcast stations and
other entities connected with government activation points." 47 C.F.R. § 11.14. These sta-
tions serve as the government's first point of contact upon the issuance of an emergency
alert. Id. The Primary Entry Point Advisory Committee ("PEPAC") manages the Primary
Entry Point program, see Primary Entry Point Advisory Committee, at http://pepac.org (last
visited Jan. 8, 2005). PEPAC has compiled a list of all thirty-four Primary Entry Point sta-
tions on their website, see Primary Entry Point Advisory Committee, at
http://pepac.org/PEPStations.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
66 See 47 C.F.R. § 11.53(a). A national EAS message contains a digital header known as
an Emergency Action Notification to inform Primary Entry Point participants of the begin-
ning of EAS activation. See id. Entities are informed that an emergency message is termi-
nated through a notice known as the Emergency Action Termination. See id. § 11.54(b)(3).
FEMA informs Primary Entry Points of a national-level EAS message via landline tele-
phone lines. See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 27.
67 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,781, para. 17.
68 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 9-10. Transmissions for the 34 Primary
Entry Points cover approximately 90% of the continental United States. Id. at 7. Under FCC
regulations, each broadcast station and cable system must monitor at least two EAS sources
in the event one source fails to relay the message. 47 C.F.R. § 11.52(d); In re Review of the
Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,781 n.32 (2004).
69 See47C.F.R.§11.1.
70 ld. §11.21.
71 "A Local Area is a geographical area of contiguous communities or counties that may
include more than one state." Id. § 11.21(b). There are approximately 550 EAS Local Areas
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serves as a contact point for individuals wishing to activate a local EAS alert.73
Other broadcasters and cable systems located near the LP-I monitor this source
and may or may not choose to interrupt their programming in order to air the
message.74
B. Federal Responsibilities for the EAS
Various federal agencies, including the FCC, FEMA, and the NOAA, share
responsibilities for administering the EAS on the federal level. The Communi-
cations Act of 1934"5 established the FCC and charged the agency with na-
tional defense and ensuring the protection of property and life through the
country's communication systems.76 The Commission has been at the forefront
of issues surrounding the nation's public warning mechanism since its incep-
tion77 and the agency's responsibilities regarding the EAS include: establishing
technical standards for implementation, testing, and activating the EAS; 8 es-
tablishing procedures for testing the EAS; and developing protocols for cable
systems and radio and television broadcasters to follow in the event of an EAS
activation.79
FEMA, a component of the Department of Homeland Security's Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate," possesses the sole responsibility for
activating a national EAS alert.8 This duty is derived from the Robert T. Staf-
within the United States. In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at
15,781, para. 17.
72 See 47 C.F.R. §11.18(b).
73 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,781, para. 17. For
an example of how law enforcement officials may utilize Local Primary One stations'when
activating a local AMBER Alert, see TEXAS DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, TEXAS AMBER ALERT
SYSTEM 7, at ftp://ftp.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/amber/amberalert-trainingguide.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 4, 2005).
74 See47 C.F.R. §11.55(a).
75 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§151-226 (2000).
76 Id. §151. The Communications Act of 1934 established a broad authority for the FCC
to develop and enforce rules in order to further the Commission's mandate. Id. §154(i).
Other federal statutes reaffirm this mandate to utilize communication systems to promote
the safety of life and property. Id. § 154(o), §303(r), § 154(i).
77 See generally PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, app. C (compiling a history of
the EAS).
78 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,779, para. 12; see
generally 47 C.F.R. §§11.1-11.61 (listing technical standards for the EAS).
79 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,779, para. 12. Many
newer communications technologies, including satellite radio and television, are not re-
quired to participate in the EAS. Id.
80 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §313(1) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The
Department of Homeland Security is composed of five Directorates, including the Emer-
gency Preparedness and Response Directorate. Id. §§I 13(a), 311-19.
81 See Exec. Order No. 12,472, 3 C.F.R. §193 (1984); see also In re Review of the
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ford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ("Stafford Act") 2, which
empowers the agency to establish a protocol for the use of emergency commu-
nications systems in the event of an emergency.83 The Homeland Security Act
of 200284 delegated all of FEMA's statutory functions under the Stafford Act to
the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response.85 The Under
Secretary is authorized by statute86 and previous interagency agreements to
oversee the utilization of the EAS by state and local personnel, and to coordi-
nate national, state, and local level EAS alerts.87
Most EAS alerts originate from NOAA's National Weather Service
("NWS").88 NWS supplies broadcast and cable entities with localized weather
alerts via NOAA Weather Radio.89 These messages are distributed in a special-
ized protocol known as Specific Area Messaging Encoding," which may be
decoded by receiving units readily available to the general public.
9
Current administration of the EAS on the federal level is based primarily on
Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,779, para. 13.
82 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§5121-
5300 (2000).
83 Id. §5196(d).
84 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§101-557 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
85 See id §312(5). "The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred all of the statutory
functions under the Stafford Act from the Director of FEMA to the Secretary of DHS. How-
ever, these functions have been delegated to the Undersecretary for Emergency Prepared-
ness and Response..." H.R. REP. No. 108-340, at 2 (2003).
86 See 42 U.S.C. §5196(c). The statutory language used by Congress does not require
FEMA to coordinate emergency communications among the federal, state, and local levels;
it only permits such action. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the Under Secre-
tary of Emergency Preparedness and Response to develop a "national incident management
system with Federal, State, and local government..." 6 U.S.C. §312(5). The same statute
also requires the Under Secretary to help improve the effectiveness of emergency respond-
ers to man-made or natural disasters. Id. §312(1).
87 See State and Local Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS) Memorandum of Under-
standing Among the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Memorandum of Understanding], reprinted in PPW: EAS
ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, app. K.
88 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,780, para. 14 (2004). Reports of EAS activations are currently volun-
tary. EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, app. 2, at 46-47. Accordingly, publicly
available statistics for EAS activations are difficult to find. See Press Release, Federal
Communications Commission, Emergency Alert System (EAS) Activation Reports Volun-
tarily Submitted by Broadcasters to the FCC in 1998, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Comp-
liance/NewsReleases/1998/nrci8O23.txt (Oct. 22, 1998). However, it is estimated that
nearly 80% of EAS messages are initiated by NWS. PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15,
at 7.
89 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 7.
90 See generally id. at 18-19.
91 Some NOAA Weather Radio units are capable of automatically switching on upon
receipt of an emergency message. EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 32.
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a 1981 Memorandum of Understanding, a 1984 Executive Order, and a 1995
Presidential Statement of Requirements. 92 In 1981, the FCC, FEMA, and
NOAA all signed a Memorandum of Understanding detailing each agency's
responsibilities and objectives for the EBS administration on the federal level. 93
President Reagan signed an Executive Order in 1984 that established the Na-
tional Communications System to coordinate and advise the President on is-
sues pertaining to emergency preparedness of telecommunications systems
throughout the federal government.94 The Order also gave FEMA managerial
oversight of the EBS.95 In 1995, President Clinton signed a Presidential State-
ment of Requirements addressing presidential communications with the public
during a state of national emergency. 96
C. State Participation in the EAS
To date, the EAS has only been used on the state or local level. 97 States and
localities may utilize the EAS to disseminate emergency messages through
media outlets within their borders; however, such participation is voluntary.99
In order to activate the EAS, a state or locality must develop an EAS State or
Local Area Plan. 99 States and localities typically organize a State Emergency
Communications Committee ("SECC") or a Local Emergency Communica-
tions Committee ("LECC") to develop these EAS plans.' SECCs and LECCs
are usually composed of emergency management personnel and industry vol-
unteers.'' Once the plan is developed, the SECC or LECC must submit the
State or Local Area Plans to the FCC for approval. 2
The EAS's true success has come from state and local activations. Locali-
ties, in conjunction with the NWS, utilize the EAS's capabilities primarily for
92 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,778, para. 9.
93 See 1982 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 87.
94 Exec. Order No. 12,472, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1984).
95 Id.
96 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,778, para. 9.
97 Statistics are difficult to find regarding EAS activation since reporting of EAS activa-
tions is purely voluntary. The National Science and Technology Council Committee's
Working Group on Natural Disaster Information Systems Subcommittee on Natural Disaster
Reduction has compiled the most comprehensive statistics available. See EFFECTIVE DISAS-
TER WARNINGS, supra note 13, app. 2.; see also text and accompanying note 88.
98 Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2004).
99 Id. §11.21.
1oo See In re Amendment of Part 73, Subpart G, of the Commission's Rules Regarding
the Emergency Broadcast System, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 10 FCC Rcd. 1786, 1834-35, paras. 131-35 (1994).
101 See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,780, para. 15.
102 47 C.F.R. § 11.21.
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weather alerts."3 In fact, roughly 80% of the EAS's activations originate from
the NWS.'" However, localities also issue AMBER Alerts via the EAS in an
effort to find missing or kidnapped children.' °5 While these applications dem-
onstrate innovations occurring on the local and state level, they also demon-
strate potential future uses of the EAS. For example, some states utilize elec-
tronic road signs to disseminate AMBER Alerts while others take advantage of
cellular telephony to deliver relevant text messages to a user's handset.'
0 6 De-
spite these advances, such inconsistencies may undermine the very purpose of
a public warning system and threaten the overall effectiveness of the EAS.
7
D. 9/11 Aftermath: Renewed Interest in the EAS
After the 9/11 Commission released its final report, a great deal of interest
focused on the recommendations contained therein.' 8 The report highlighted
potential uses of the nation's communications infrastructure to save lives and
exposed many weaknesses in the system at the same time.'
9 Largely absent
from the public debate was any reference to the EAS or any public warning
mechanism."0 Virtually no discussion centered on the EAS's primary weak-
ness: the system's reliance on broadcast and cable to disseminate messages
requires an individual to be tuned into a broadcast or cable station in order to
receive a message via the EAS."'
Despite the EAS's ability to effectively reach only a limited portion of the
population, technological advances present exciting possibilities for future im-
103 See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,780, para. 14.
'04 Id.
105 See Jacqueline L. Salmon, A System To Break Up Abductions, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,
2001, at B 1. In 2002, the FCC adopted an EAS event code for missing children alerts. See In
re Amendment of Part II of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency Alert Sys-
tem, Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 4055, 4064-65, para. 19 (2002). To date, almost all
states have adopted an AMBER Alert plan which utilizes EAS to disseminate messages in
an attempt to recover lost children. PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 9.
106 Texas has integrated Internet, radio broadcasts, and electronic roadway signs all as
part of the AMBER Alert system for that state. See TEXAS DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, TEXAS
AMBER ALERT SYSTEM 7, at ftp://ftp.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/amber/amber alerttrain-
ngguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005). Louisiana incorporates text messages delivered to
cell phones as part of its AMBER Alert program. See Editorial, Virtual Dragnet, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 30, 2004, at 6.
107 See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,776, para. 3.
108 See Richard W. Stevenson and David D. Kirkpatrick, Administration Moves To Re-
gain Initiative on 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at Al; Maura Reynolds and Maria L. La
Ganga, 9/11 Reforms May Come Soon, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at A 13.
109 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 396-97.
110 See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1; see generally THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 361-428.
111 McConnell, supra note 14, at 34.
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plementations." 2 In light of the shift from a Cold War era attack to the unpre-
dictable tactics of terrorists, the FCC responded by seeking to update the
EAS." 3 In August 2004, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
seeking comments on potential uses of the system to respond to future emer-
gency situations.' 4 The Commission views the system as a method to save
lives and also provide useful, up-to-date information as an event unfolds."5
1II. DEFINING THE EAS PARTICIPANTS' ROLES
Much of the discussion surrounding the revamping of the EAS has centered
on the incorporation of technological advances."6 However, the dilemma cur-
rently facing the EAS is more properly characterized as regulatory neglect
rather than technical modernization."7 The most significant obstacle hindering
the effectiveness of the EAS is a lack of clearly defined roles among all entities
responsible for the system's administration."' Without the proper amount of
112 Id. at 1, 34.
113 See FCC Seeks Comment on Rule Changes for the Emergency Alert System, supra
note 22, at 2-3. In the United States, two public/private partnerships, the Partnership for
Public Warning and the Media Security and Reliability Council, have spearheaded the effort
in examining the role the EAS may play during national emergencies. See In re Review of
the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,782,
para. 21 (2004). In early 2002, leaders from the disaster warning community incorporated
the Partnership for Public Warning to study and recommend improvements to the nation's
public warning systems. See Partnership for Public Warning, at
http://partnershipforpublicwaming.org/ppw/about.html (last modified Jan. 21, 2005). The
Partnership for Public Warning was created in response to a report issued by the President's
National Science and Technology Council which called for the development of a pub-
lic/private partnership to study public warning issues. See EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS,
supra note 13, at 39. Also, in 2002, the FCC chartered the second of these groups, a federal
advisory group known as the Media Security and Reliability Council. See supra text accom-
panying note 46. The Media Security and Reliability Council's mandate covers a broad
range of topics from physical security of the communications infrastructure to assessing
communications between government and the public during a national disaster. Id
114 Review of the Emergency Alert System, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,843 (proposed Aug. 30,
2004) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 11).
115 See Homeland Security Advisory System: Threat Codes and Public Responses: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Nat 'l Sec., Emerging Threats and Int l Relations of the House
Comm. on Govt Reform, 108th Congress (statement of Kenneth B. Allen) 9, at
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Allen%20Testimony.pdf (Mar. 16, 2004).
116 See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1, 34.
117 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16-17; P'SHIP FOR PUB. WARNING, PPW
REPORT 2003-01, A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INTEGRATED PUBLIC WARNING POLICY AND
CAPABILITY 4, at http://www.partnershipforpublicwarning.org/ppw/docs/nationalstrategy-
final.pdf (May 16, 2003).
118 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. Both the Media Security and Reliability
Council and Partnership for Public Warning have indicated that the lack of coordination and
oversight among federal, state, and local entities significantly hinders the effectiveness of
EAS. Id.; see PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 28; see also Jube Shiver Jr., Warn-
[Vol. 13
Reworking the Emergency Alert System
coordination among federal, state, local, and private entities, the chances of
communicating an effective warning message to the public is diminished."9
The EAS exists as a model of cooperative federalism among the various lev-
els of government involved in administering the system.' 21 Under a coopera-
tive federalism structure, the federal government defines standards while each
state implements the details of the program.' 2' This model benefits both state
and federal actors by giving states the flexibility to meet their individualized
needs while ensuring a consistent nationwide implementation of a particular
policy.'2 2 Despite this exemplary structure, the EAS remains threatened by
weak federal oversight of the system.'23
A. The Problem: Confusion Surrounding Federal Oversight
A cooperative federalism model is ideal for a national system such as EAS
that requires federal and state coordination and collaboration.'
24 This model
provides a necessary degree of flexibility, allowing states and localities to im-
plement the system to best suit their needs.' 25 Local efforts, such as AMBER
Alert Programs,'26 allow states to quickly communicate with the public by inte-
ings Raised About 'This Is a Test' System, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 19, 2003, at CN9 (describing
coordination problems surrounding the EAS). The FCC has commented that the structure of
EAS is as much to blame as equipment issues. See In re Amendment of Part 73, Subpart G,
of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency Broadcast System, Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 1786, 1834, para. 131 (1994).
19 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16.
120 See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the En-
forcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1696 (2001).
121 Id.
122 See Raymond W. Lawton, The State Role in Telecommunications Regulation: Models
of Cooperative Federalism for Telecommunications, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 71, 86-89
(1996).
123 See supra text and accompanying note 118.
124 Lawton, supra note 122, at 73.
125 FCC regulations permit states and localities to voluntarily link into the EAS and cus-
tomize the system to meet their diverse needs. See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47
C.F.R. §11.11 (2004); McConnell, supra note 14, at 34. While some localities are more
prone to certain disasters, others may not be. Ultimately, each locality is susceptible to some
form of threat, be it man-made, natural, or otherwise. For example, the Midwestern United
States, also known as Tornado Alley, is prone to severe weather each year. Other more
densely populated portions of the country are more probable targets for terrorist attacks. See
PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 26.
126 For more information on AMBER Alert Programs, see generally Nat'l Ctr. for Miss-
ing and Exploited Children, at http://www.missingkids.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). The
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children serves as a support organization for
states and localities wishing to establish AMBER Alert plans. See Nat'l Ctr. for Missing and
Exploited Children, at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/Pageservlet?Lan-
guageCountry=enUS&Pageld=477 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). The organization compiles
a list of AMBER Alert plans implemented throughout the country. Id.
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grating outlets such as Internet portals and electronic roadway signs with EAS
broadcasts.'27
In addition, the cooperative federalism structure provides a framework by
which the federal government may provide oversight and guidance concerning
the consistent implementation of the EAS across the nation.' 2' By clearly de-
fining these roles and strengthening the federal government's supervisory du-
ties, the system will be better situated to save lives and preserve property.'29
The current federal administration of the EAS has failed to provide adequate
standards for state participants thereby limiting the effectiveness of the sys-
tem. '3 On the federal level, several executive agencies including the FCC and
FEMA collectively contribute to the administration of the EAS.' Due to the
varying roles among these agencies, no federal entity has taken the lead in co-
ordinating the EAS or implementing improvements to the system, technologi-
cal or otherwise.12 These governmental tasks must be more clearly defined
and delineated if the EAS is to meet its potential.' 33
127 Studies have stressed that the chances of finding a missing child alive are signifi-
cantly increased if a message is quickly spread to the surrounding community. Statistics
indicate that 74% of kidnapped children are killed within three hours of the abduction. Ken-
neth A. Hanfland et al., Case Management for Missing Children Homicide Investigation:
Executive Summary 3, at http://www.findthekids.com/pdf/casemanag.pdf (May 1997).
Texas has integrated Internet, radio broadcasts, and electronic roadway signs all as part of
the AMBER Alert system for that state. See TEXAS DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, TEXAS AMBER
ALERT SYSTEM 7, at ftp://ftp.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/amber/amber-alert-trainingguide.pdf
(last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
128 The ability of the federal government to provide oversight and minimal standards for
a system is one of the benefits of a cooperative federalism. See Lawton, supra note 122, at
86-89.
129 A set of minimal EAS standards throughout the nation will increase the chances that
transient members of the population receive an emergency alert, enable equipment manufac-
turers to produce EAS receivers at a lower cost, and cut down on the cost of educating per-
sonnel responsible for the technical aspects of operating the system. PPW: EAS ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 15, app. C, at 44.
130 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16.
131 See 1982 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 87. Other federal agencies have
roles regarding the EAS. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion participates in the EAS; however, the agency's role lies predominately in activating the
system to disseminate severe weather warnings. PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at
7.
132 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. In the wake of the 9/11 Commission
Report, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to modernize the EAS; In
re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd.
15,775 (2004).
133 Several commentators have recommended that a single federal entity have oversight
responsibility for EAS administration. The Partnership for Public Warning has suggested
that the Department of Homeland Security assume primary responsibility for improving the
EAS. PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 30. The MSRC has suggested one federal
entity be responsible for administering a national warning mechanism. MSRC: FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 18, at 7.
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B. Strengthening the FCC's Roles and Responsibilities
The FCC currently implements technical standards for the EAS and should
continue to do so.' Congress has delegated regulatory authority over many of
the nation's communications systems to the FCC.'35 Further, the Commission
is composed of individuals from diverse backgrounds who typically embrace
technological advances - a key factor contributing to the effectiveness of the
EAS. " 6 Despite having the requisite regulatory authority and delegated re-
sponsibility to adopt technological standards advancing the public interest, the
Commission has demonstrated a relaxed attitude toward modernizing the
EAS. 3 7 The FCC may strengthen the effectiveness of the EAS by undertaking
a two-prong strategy: integrating various technological advances into the sys-
tem "'38 and expanding mandatory participation for existing EAS participants.'
39
First, the Commission must embrace the incorporation of technological ad-
vances into EAS. The Commission currently encourages, but does not require,
well-established technologies such as mobile communication systems and sat-
ellite television or radio services to carry EAS messages.
4 ° By requiring lim-
ited participation and only encouraging voluntary involvement in the system,
the FCC has failed to ensure that EAS messages reach an increasingly frag-
134 See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. §§l 1.31-11.35 (2004). In October
2004, FEMA announced a pilot project, known as Digital EAS ("DEAS") that utilizes Digi-
tal Television and satellite systems to disseminate EAS messages. See Dinesh Kumar,
Comm Daily Notebook, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Oct. 22 2004, at 5. FEMA neglected to
include the FCC in the discussions of the system. In doing so, FEMA underscored the need
for greater coordination between the two agencies since the FCC has sought comment on
this very issue. See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,786-
87, para. 30.
135 The FCC's mandate allows the agency to regulate communication systems affecting
interstate commerce in the public interest. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§151 (2000). When dealing with new technologies, Congress tends to explicitly authorize
the FCC to regulate those areas. See infra Part IV.A.
136 The FCC has demonstrated its acceptance of emerging technologies and standards
throughout the agency's existence. One notable example is the Commission's initiation of
proceedings in 1987 regarding the adoption of a digital architecture for television. In re
Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast Ser-
vice; Review of Technical and Operational Requirements: Part 73-E, Television Broadcast
Stations; Reevaluation of the UHF Television Channel and Distance Separation Require-
ments of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5125 (1987).
"37 The Commission has failed to mandate participation in EAS for satellite radio and
television services even though it has regulatory authority over these services. See Nat'l
Ass'n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding the FCC's au-
thority to regulate direct satellite broadcasts as a point-to-multi-point service).
138 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16-18.
'39 See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 11.
140 See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. §11.1 (2004); In re Review of the




mented segment of the American population. 4' The FCC must mandate EAS
requirements for newer, yet well-established, communications systems and
technologies to ensure the system reaches a broader, dispersed audience. 42 In
doing so, the Commission will ensure that first responders may select a tech-
nology to meet the needs of a particular emergency scenario.'43 For example, if
first responders decide that a building should be evacuated, delivering text
messages to cell phones and wireless devices within the vicinity of the building
may be more appropriate than initiating a county-wide radio and television
alert. Consequently, an increasing number of lives will be saved and the possi-
bility of preserving property is increased.'"
Second, the FCC must require existing EAS participants to carry messages
initiated by state and local entities. The FCC currently provides the only man-
datory federal oversight of state and local level EAS uses, requiring each gov-
ernment entity wishing to activate the EAS to submit a Local Area Plan to the
agency before they may access the system.'45 Even if an FCC-approved plan is
in place on the state or local level, regulations do not require media outlets to
carry local or state initiated EAS messages.'46 Estimates suggest that broad-
casters and cable systems carry only about 50% of EAS communications acti-
vated by local officials.'47
The FCC must mandate participation for these entities to ensure the public
141 See supra text accompanying note 24. The FCC must strike a balance between EAS
participation and local news provided by television and radio broadcasters. The Commission
does not currently mandate broadcasters to carry local or state initiated alerts. 47 C.F.R.
§ 11.55(a). Many broadcasters fulfill an important role in informing the public of local man-
made and natural disasters. Such broadcasters are in a position to deliver specific localized
information to the viewing public. Often times, the public has a significant amount of confi-
dence in emergency warning broadcasts issued by local television and radio entities. See
Kirstin Dow & Susan L. Cutter, Crying Wolf: Repeat Responses to Hurricane Evacuation
Orders, 26 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 237 (1998). A small survey conducted in 1998 indicates
that people respond to evacuation orders issued through the local media in the event of a
hurricane. Id. at 247-48. Survey respondents listed media, including warnings from the Na-
tional Weather Service, the Weather Channel, and other local media sources as the most
convincing factor for choosing to evacuate an area. Id. This rationale scored higher than
evacuation orders issued from state and local officials and emergency responders. Id. at 246
tbl.4.
142 See infra text and accompanying note 217.
143 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16-18.
144 By increasing the methods by which people may receive EAS messages, the chances
are increased that people may take preventative action to save lives and property. The pro-
liferation of cell phones over the past decade presents a significant opportunity for regula-
tors to disseminate emergency messages to a wider, increasingly mobile audience. For sta-
tistical data documenting the sources vying for the public's attention, see infra text and ac-
companying note 217.
145 See 47 C.F.R. §11.21.
146 Id. §11.41.
141 See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 11.
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receives a timely warning. By engaging in this two-prong strategy, the FCC
will increase the chances that people receive relevant emergency messages.
The Commission will also give first responders flexibility in choosing an ap-
propriate communications medium to fit their needs while alleviating the bur-
den of broadcasters and cable systems who shoulder much of the EAS weight.
C. Strengthening FEMA's Roles and Responsibilities
Regulators must also overcome the lack of organization present in state and
local level EAS coordination caused largely by the absence of federal leader-
ship.'48 The EAS was designed with the understanding that each state and ma-
jor city would implement the system.'
49 However, not every state has done
so.15 FEMA is well-positioned to undertake this responsibility and has the
statutory authority to do so.' The Homeland Security Act of 2002 charged
FEMA with coordinating emergency response on the federal, state and local
level. 5 2 Currently, the agency does not actively oversee or encourage state
implementation of the EAS. 5 3 While this absence of oversight by FEMA has
granted states and localities a great deal of discretion in developing an EAS
strategy to meet their needs,'54 it has resulted in the inconsistent implementa-
148 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16-17. States and localities wishing to par-
ticipate in EAS need only submit an EAS Local Area Plan to the FCC approval. See 47
C.F.R. §11.21. The FCC does not encourage a particular plan and has not established a set
of model procedures for state or local EAS procedures. Id.
149 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 17.
150 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 26. Note that several states frequently
affected by natural disasters have developed state EAS plans. For example, California,
which is susceptible to earthquakes, and Florida, often the target of hurricanes, have dedi-
cated resources to EAS implementation. Id.
15 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 specifically gave FEMA's Under-Secretary for
Emergency Preparedness and Response responsibility for "building a comprehensive na-
tional incident management system with Federal, State, and local government personnel,
agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters..." See Homeland Secu-
rity Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §312(5) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
152 See infra text accompanying note 153. Congress intended that the Under Secretary
"oversee Federal, State and local emergency preparedness training and exercise programs
and provide Federal assistance for any emergency, natural or man-made . . ." S. REP. No.
107-175, at 25 (2002). An Executive Order signed by President Reagan in 1984 tasked
FEMA with "[d]evelop[ing], upon request ... plans and capabilities for, and provide policy
and management oversight of, the Emergency Broadcast System, and advise and assist pri-
vate radio licensees of the [Federal Communications] Commission in developing emergency
communications plans, procedures and capabilities." Exec. Order No. 12,472, 3 C.F.R. 193
(1984).
153 The FCC has the responsibility of overseeing that broadcasters and cable providers
implement EAS; however, no federal entity oversees state implementation of the system.
MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16.
154 See McConnell, supra note 14, at 34.
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tion of the system with no minimum consistent standards.'55
Some states have adopted EAS plans, but others are inadequate and "make-
shift at best."'56 In those districts with no EAS State or Local Area Plan, first
responders must rely on the media, word of mouth, or door-to-door warnings
to inform people of the appropriate action to take in the event of an emer-
gency.'57 Neither FEMA, nor any other federal entity, actively encourages
states, localities, and municipalities to develop EAS plans and participate in the
system.'58 In order to increase the EAS' effectiveness, FEMA must implement
procedures to better coordinate the system among all levels of government
prior to a disaster.'59
The United Kingdom's National Steering Committee on Warning and In-
forming the Public provides innovative insights into policies FEMA may un-
dertake to increase the overall effectiveness of the EAS. While the United
Kingdom covers an area roughly the size of Oregon, 6 ° the country faces simi-
lar problems as the United States with regard to coordinating the various gov-
ernmental entities and private parties involved in warning the public during an
emergency situation. 6 ' The United Kingdom's emerging public warning
155 See Emergency Warning Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emergency Pre-
paredness and Response of the House Select Comm. on Homeland Sec., 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of James A. Dailey, Director, Office of Homeland Security Enforcement Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission), at http://hsc.house.gov/files/Testmony%20Dail-
ey.doc (Sept. 22, 2004).
156 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 17.
157 First responders in these districts must develop alternative methods to communicate
emergency information to an at-risk population since they are prohibited by the FCC from
utilizing EAS for message dissemination. See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R.
§ 11.21 (2004).
158 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. Previously, the FCC's Emergency Alert
System National Advisory Committee facilitated EAS coordination among federal, state and
local entities. However, in 2002, the group's charter expired and failed to be renewed. Id.;
see generally Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Restructures and
Renews the Emergency Broadcast System Advisory Committee, and Renames It the Na-
tional Advisory Committee, (June 24, 1996) (providing details of the National Advisory
Committee's duties and responsibilities regarding EAS administration).
'59 See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 30.
160 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 565 (2004).
161 See NAT'L STEERING COMM. ON WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUB., INTERIM REPORT
11, at http://www.nscwip.info/nscwip_full.pdf (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter NSCWIP: INTERIM
REPORT]. Individuals discussing the public warning system in the United Kingdom recog-
nize that clear definition of roles and responsibilities are crucial to assuring the effectiveness
of the system. Id. at 4, 9. A public/private partnership known as the National Steering
Committee on Warning and Informing the Public has spearheaded the effort to mold the
country's emerging public warning system in an efficient and effective mechanism for sav-
ing lives and protecting property. Id. at iii. The group cites the success of the United King-
dom's Environmental Agency's flood warning system as demonstrating the importance of
clearly defined roles in a public warning mechanism. See id at 4, 9. Under the National
Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Public's plan, the United Kingdom's
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model "'62 provides useful insight into the potential structuring of the United
States' public warning mechanism on the federal,'63 state, and local levels."
6
Legislation known as the Civil Contingencies Act'65 will ultimately develop
a structured protocol between national and local governments for disseminat-
ing emergency communications.'66 On the regional and local level, the Civil
Contingencies Act mandates a framework to guide participants reacting to an
emergency situation.'67 The bill seeks to establish relationships among first
responders and other parties that play a role in responding to a disaster.'
68 Ad-
ditionally, the statute clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of those re-
sponding to an emergency situation.'69 Of particular interest is the method by
which the Civil Contingencies Act structures local responses to emergency
situations, distinguishing emergency planning and response duties among
Cabinet Office would be responsible for developing policies among localities and other
governmental agencies to maximize effectiveness of the mechanism. NAT'L STEERING
COMM. ON WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUB., PROGRESS REPORT 6, at
http://www.nscwip.info/nscprogrpt.pdf (July 2002) [hereinafter NSCWIP: PROGRESS
REPORT]. In the event of a national emergency, this Agency would serve as a contact point
for emergency managers and first responders seeking to distribute messages before, during,
and after the incident. Id. at 7.
162 Since the mid-1990s, members of United Kingdom government, emergency services,
media, and industry have sought to address the country's absence of a public warning
mechanism. NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, at iii. The National Steering Com-
mittee on Warning and Informing the Public has produced three recommendation reports
since the group's inception. See National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing
the Public, at http://www.nscwip.info (last visited Jan. 4 2005).
163 See NSCWIP: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 161, at 6.
164 See Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, pts. 1-3, scheds. 1-3 (Eng.).
165 Id. The Civil Contingencies Bill received Royal Assent and became an Act of Parlia-
ment on November 18, 2004. News Release, U.K. Cabinet Office, Public Consultation on
Civil Contingencies Act Regulations and Guidance Launched Today, at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news releases/2004/04 1209_ccbill.asp?ID=5 I
(Dec. 9, 2004). The Civil Contingencies Act has been criticized by civil libertarians who
argue that it gives the United Kingdom government too broad powers. Nigel Morris, Gov-
ernment to Scale Back Emergency Laws Under Pressure From Civil Liberties Groups, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 8, 2004, at 2. Cf. Editorial, Extraordinary Powers Are Only
Needed in the Most Dire of Emergencies, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 8, 2004, at 16.
166 See Civil Contingencies Act pt. 1 cl. 2. The National Steering Committee for Warn-
ing and Informing the Public advocates the clear definition of roles among all entities par-
ticipating in the nation's public warning system. NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note
161, at 4. The Civil Contingencies Act provides a structure whereby government officials
interact with one another and private industry participants. Civil Contingencies Act pt. 1 cls.
2(3)-(4). Additionally, the statute places oversight responsibility with the Cabinet Office.
See id.
167 See Civil Contingencies Act sched. 1, pt. 1.
168 See CABINET OFFICE, DRAFT CIVIL CONTINGENCIES BILL, CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
16, at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/ccbill/consultdoc.pdf (June




Category I and Category 2 responders. 70 Category 1 responders consist of city
councils, emergency officials (law enforcement, fire departments), health ser-
vices, environmental services, and the Secretary of State.'7 ' Category 2 re-
sponders are comprised of members of the business sector such as public utili-
ties and transportation services.'7 2 The statute requires that a Category I entity
must "maintain arrangements to warn the public, and to provide information
and advice to the public .. .""' In effect, this imposes a statutory duty on
Category 1 responders to continually assess risks to their communities.'74 Un-
der this framework, local responders carry the responsibility of warning the
public and are assured access to the message distribution system. '75
Neither FEMA, nor Congress for that matter, has the power to mandate this
type of framework on state or municipal executive entities.'76 However, FEMA
may, and should, establish a set of model procedures based on the United
Kingdom's structure to guide states and localities in the implementation of
EAS Local Area Plans.'77 Such rules, if adopted by states and localities, would
help resolve much of the existing confusion among emergency planners, other
government officials, and the media.'78 The rules would also help answer ques-
tions prior to the occurrence of an emergency event thereby reducing impro-
vised emergency strategies.'79
The Civil Contingencies Act does not specify a strict protocol for coordina-
tion among national and local level entities in responding to an emergency
situation. 8 ° However, the legislation does establish a Regional Nominated
'70 See Civil Contingencies Act pt. 1 cls. 2(3)-(4), scheds. 1-4.
17' See id. sched. 1, pt. 1.
172 See id. sched. 1, pt. 3; see also Kim Thomas, Enlisting the Private to Protect the Pub-
lic, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 14, 2004, at FT Report-Understanding Corporate Secu-
rity, at 1.
173 See Civil Contingencies Act pt. 1 cl. 2(l)(g).
'74 See DRAFT CIVIL CONTINGENCIES BILL, supra note 168, at 18.
175 Id.
176 The federal government may not direct the activities of local executive branches.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-08 (1997).
177 By dividing entities involved in disseminating warnings into appropriate categories,
such as Category 1 and Category 2 responders, and establishing model guidelines for these
EAS participants to follow, the federal government may help transition into a standardiza-
tion of messages and alleviate potential confusion in a public warning. See Emergency
Warning Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emergency Preparedness and Re-
sponse of the House Select Comm. on Homeland Sec., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of
Kathleen Henning, President of K.G. Henning & Associates, a certified emergency man-
ager, and retired Program Coordinator of Montgomery County, Maryland Office of Emer-




'80 See DRAFT CIVIL CONTINGENCIES BILL, supra note 168, at 22.
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Coordinator who would facilitate communication between national and local
emergency personnel. 8'
FEMA, the agency responsible for coordinating the EAS among federal,
state, and local officials, should establish regional directors to serve as a con-
duit between the federal government and states and localities.'82 FEMA cur-
rently divides the United States into ten regions that provide an existing struc-
ture for this type of coordination.'83 By appointing a person within each of
these already existing regional offices, FEMA can increase the flow of com-
munication regarding EAS implementation among the national government
and state and local governments.
FEMA must also encourage private industry participation in the EAS. By
reducing the elapsed amount of time between an emergency situation and a
public warning, the chances of saving lives and preserving property is in-
creased.'84 If private industries that may pose a danger to the surrounding
community, such as chemical manufacturers, are included in EAS planning,
the chances of protecting people are increased.'85 Such integration would help
ensure that timely warnings are disseminated, whether people are ordered to
stay indoors with the windows shut during a chemical spill or whether the im-
mediate area needs to be evacuated.'86 Certain industries involving hazardous
materials, such as nuclear power plants,'87 are already required by law to de-
velop warning plans for surrounding areas in the event a dangerous condition
arises.'88 FEMA should coordinate the integration of the EAS into these emer-
gency plans in order to increase the timeliness of a public warning.
To encourage certain industries to participate in EAS planning, legislation
should be considered that limits the liability of private parties.'89 Often, these
181 See Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, pt. 2 cl. 24(l)(b), 24(3) (Eng.).
182 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §312(5) (2000).
183 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT FISCAL YEAR 2002, at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ofm/fema_al031103.pdf.
184 The effectiveness of a warning is directly affected by the amount of time elapsed
between the warning and the occurrence of an emergency event. See EFFECTIVE DISASTER
WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 14.
185 See PPW: DEVELOPING A UNIFIED ALL-HAZARD PUBLIC WARNING SYSTEM, supra
note 21, at 18-19.
186 See EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 18-19.
1s8 FEMA and the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission have approved plans to util-
ize the EAS to alert the public near nuclear power plants in the event of a disaster. Id. app.
2, at 46. The FCC adopted an event code for nuclear power plant warnings. See In re
Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Emergency Alert System,
Report and Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 4055, 4065-66, paras. 21-22 (2002).
188 See Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness, 44 C.F.R. §350.5(a)(6) (2004).




industries are concerned with the potential liability arising from such warn-
ings9 and are reluctant to issue a warning themselves-instead relying on gov-
ernment agencies to do so.' With the incentive of limited liability, private
industries may be less reluctant to initiate a timely warning that benefits public
safety.
92
D. Summation: Developing a Comprehensive Coordination Strategy
The proper structure for federal administration of the EAS is currently in
place. The system's design allows federal regulators to mandate consistent
standards to be utilized nationwide while giving states the necessary flexibility
to improve emergency communications with their constituent populations.
However, federal administration of the EAS needs to be strengthened. The
FCC must undertake responsibility for the technical aspects of the system
while FEMA spearheads the coordination of the system among federal, state,
and local entities. Ultimately, these two agencies must work together to ensure
the modernization and effectiveness of the EAS as a whole.
193
IV. LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM TECHNOLOGICAL
IMPLEMENTATIONS
The telecommunications industry has experienced significant technological
advances during the past several decades. 94 From the mass conversion of ana-
log to digital technology, to the proliferation of wireless communications, the
industry has undergone considerable change since the inception of the EAS
and its predecessors.' Since September 11, regulators realize the importance
190 Id. at 18-19.
191 Id. Regulations do not require these industries to inform the public of an emergency
directly. Instead, state and local governments are required to do so. See 44 C.F.R.
§350.5(a)(6).
192 See PPW: DEVELOPING A UNIFIED ALL-HAZARD PUBLIC WARNING SYSTEM, supra note
21, at 5, 19.
193 The Partnership for Public Warning suggests that the agencies sign a Memorandum
of Understanding detailing each party's responsibility for EAS. See PPW: EAS ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 15, at 31. However, such an understanding may not provide the level of
accountability and initiative necessary to continually maintain a modem EAS. Instead, the
agencies may seek to codify their roles in the Code of Federal Regulations or Congress may
seek to enact legislation designed for this purpose.
114 For example, broadcast television is currently in the process of undergoing a switch
from analog signals to digital transmission. See In re Public Interest Obligations of TV
Broadcast Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 14 FCC Rcd. 21,633, 21,642, paras. 18, 20 (1999).
See infra text accompanying note 217.
195 The expansion of cellular telephony is perhaps one of the best examples of the evolu-
tion of the telecommunications industry over the past several years. See infra text accompa-
[Vol. 13
Reworking the Emergency Alert System
of utilizing mass communication devices in order to connect directly with a
greater number of people affected by an emergency.'96 The FCC stands as the
gatekeeper for regulating communications technologies and is well positioned
to determine which advances to incorporate into an emergency warning system
and how to do sO.' In doing so, the agency must determine which technolo-
gies provide the greatest benefit to the public at large and how to analyze legal
issues regarding mandatory technological changes imposed upon telecommu-
nications providers.
A. The FCC's Power to Implement Technological Changes and Relevant
Policies
Congress established the FCC as an independent agency'98 to regulate inter-
state commerce via communications.'99 While neither the legislative nor ex-
ecutive branch directly controls the activities of the FCC, each of the three
branches of the federal government exercises certain checks over the Commis-
sion's actions. 00
nying note 217.
196 See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,776, para. 2 (2004); see FCC Seeks Comment on Rule Changes for the
Emergency Alert System, supra note 22, at 2-3.
197 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,776, para 6, 15,786,
para. 29. For background relating the Commission's initiative to automate EAS, see gener-
ally Inquiry into Possible Technical Improvements in the Emergency Broadcasting System,
Notice of Inquiry, 6 FCC Rcd. 4264 (1991).
198 An independent agency is "[a] federal agency, commission, or board that is not under
the direction of the executive..." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). There appears to
be no consistent definition of what constitutes an independent agency. See Angel Manuel
Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 461, 469 (1994). However, several commentators have described the President's
lack of removal power over agency's officers as key in determining whether an agency is
independent or not. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light
of Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 216; Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are
Independent Regulatory Agencies?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 252; see also THOMAS G. KRATTEN-
MAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONs LAW AND POLICY 20, (2d ed. 1998) (describing the charac-
teristics of the FCC as an independent agency). FCC Commissioners are appointed by the
President to serve five-year terms. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
19 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000). Congressional authority to
regulate communications systems transcending state borders stems from the Commerce
Power. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
200 2 HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW 369 (1999). Congress
controls the FCC's budget, enacts legislation establishing and delegating power to the
agency, and oversees the agency's operations. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(k) (2000). The President appoints a Chairman of the Commission and nominates indi-
viduals to serve as Commissioners with the Senate's advice and consent. Id. §154(a). The
judiciary exercises review of the Commission's actions and ensures they do not violate the
agency's mandate or the Constitution. Id. §402; see generally 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra, at
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The Communications Act of 1934 initially gave the FCC jurisdiction over
the primary communications technologies existing at the time - common car-
rier services and broadcast transmissions."' Legislators could not possibly
foresee future technological developments. When a new communications tech-
nology surfaces, the FCC must either determine some existing basis for regu-
lating the technology or await congressional expansion of the agency's regula-
tory power."' In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the Commis-
sion's right to police emerging communications technologies that directly af-
fect the agency's regulatory jurisdiction.0 3
The Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the FCC to regulate through its
administrative rulemaking power." Under this authority, the FCC may estab-
lish guidelines for all parties over which it exercises jurisdiction. 5 One of the
FCC's core statutory duties under the Communications Act of 1934 is to en-
sure that the nation's communications systems provide an effective means for
protecting life and property. 6 Accordingly, the Commission may promulgate
rules that require industry participants to meet minimal technical requirements
to disseminate emergency messages. 7 Currently, the FCC requires broadcast-
369-70 (1999) (explaining the FCC's powers).
201 The Communications Act of 1934 mandated the FCC to regulate "interstate and for-
eign commerce in communication by wire and radio..." 47 U.S.C. § 151. This included the
regulation of telephone and telegraph services, so-called common carriers, and radio and
television broadcasts. 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 379.
202 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 380.
203 The FCC has authority under its ancillary jurisdiction to relate technologies related to
the Commission's authority. United States v. S.W. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). While
the Supreme Court has recognized the FCC's ability to regulate new technologies, the
agency's jurisdiction is limited. Any regulatory regime the Commission enacts must fall
within the agency's statutory authority and must rationally relate to another of services fal-
ling within the agency's jurisdiction. Nat'l Ass'n of Broad. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 381.
204 The Commission may "perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and
issue such orders[] . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 47 U.S.C.
§ 154(i). The Commission's rulemaking power is governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551-576 (2000). Mary C. Dollarhide, Surrogate Rule Making: Problems
and Possibilities Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1032
(1988); see generally 5 U.S.C. §553 (describing the administrative rule making procedure).
205 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942).
206 47 U.S.C. §151 (codifying the FCC's duties relating to broadcasting). Various other
statutory provisions require the FCC to ensure the protection of life and property. See infra
text and accompanying note 207. Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 in
1936 to require the FCC to promote the safety of life and property through radio communi-
cations. This amendment was targeted toward sea vessels. See S. REP. No. 74-2060, at 1
(1936).
207 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (delegating authority to the FCC to issue rules and regulations "as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions."). The FCC is also mandated to study
how broadcast communications may save lives and property and to examine "the best meth-
ods of obtaining the cooperation and coordination of these systems." Id. § 154(o); see also
JVol. 13
Reworking the Emergency Alert System
ers and cable companies to install specialized equipment that receives and de-
codes EAS messages."' Regulators have questioned whether the scope of the
EAS may be expanded to cover additional communication services such as
common carriers and satellite providers.' 9 The answer to this question de-
pends on a technology-specific analysis.2 For example, the FCC's ability to
regulate broadcast communications stems from a separate set of statutory au-
thority and interpretation than the Commission's power to regulate satellite
communication services.2 ' However, the Commission's authority to study
how communication systems may be used to save lives and property falls
within the general statutory provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 and
is applicable to all sectors that the FCC regulates.2 2
B. Short Term Implementations: Taking Advantage of the Existing
Capabilities to Reaching a Broad Audience
A robust, diverse telecommunications infrastructure exists within the United
States, and the FCC must utilize the existing architecture in order to increase
the effectiveness of the EAS in the short term.2 3 The EAS currently relies pre-
dominantly on over-the-air broadcasts and cable television transmissions to
communicate localized emergency messages.2 4 While a majority of the popu-
lation has access to one or more of these media outlets, most Americans spend
only a fraction of their daytime hours actually watching television or listening
id. §303(r) (permitting the Commission to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe
such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions [concerning radio transmissions]"). The President may take preference over
any communication system during a time of war or if he finds it "necessary for the national
defense and security..." Id. §606(a). Congress has delegated explicit authority to the FCC
to establish EAS participation for cable systems. See id. §544(g).
208 See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. §§ 11.31-11.35 (2004). Other entities
such as direct broadcast satellite and satellite radio providers are not required to carry EAS
messages. See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 19 FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,779, para. 12 (2004).
209 See In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,779, para. 12.
210 See generally 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 547-56 (providing historical
background for common carrier regulation); Id. at 115-25 (providing historical background
for the regulation of broadcasts).
211 See generally 2 ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 200, at 547-56 (providing historical
background for common carrier regulation); Id. at 436-54 (providing historical background
for the regulation of international satellite transmissions).
212 47 U.S.C. § 154(o).
213 See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 28-29.
214 The proliferation of new media technologies such as the Internet and the wireless
communications industry has contributed to the erosion of television and radio audiences.
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, supra note 23, at 720 tbl. 1125.
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to the radio."5 The FCC must ensure that telecommunications service provid-
ers facilitate timely emergency communications with the public while mini-
mally burdening private industries that are required to participate in EAS." 6
By requiring communication services that have proliferated throughout a large
portion of society, such as cellular telephone service providers, to install EAS
equipment and mandating their participation in the system, the FCC will in-
crease the impact of the EAS with minimal costs and intrusions to both con-
sumers and industry."7
Mandatory EAS participation requirements for commercial cellular tele-
phone providers present perhaps the best short-term option for regulators seek-
ing to communicate emergency messages to a large number of citizens. The
FCC has regulatory authority over the for-profit cellular telephone industry, or
Commercial Mobile Radio Services.2 8 In 1996, the FCC began utilizing this
authority to require cellular providers to provide 911 support for their sub-
scribers." 9 The Commission specifically cited its statutory authority to protect
lives and property as permitting the promulgation of such requirements.22 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia later supported the FCC's regu-
lations, holding that the Commission may require entities under its regulatory
umbrella to bear financial burdens in order to increase public safety."'
The mobile phone industry possesses characteristics ideal for utilization of
215 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 21-22. The Partnership for Public Warning
has collected and compiled statistics regarding the number of hours Americans listen to
radio and watch television. See id.
216 Id. at 28-29.
217 Id. In 2001, over one-half of American households had access to a cellular telephone.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, supra note 23, at 621 tbl.977. The
Census Bureau estimates that the United States population will reach 292,801,000. Id. at 9
tbl.3. The Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association estimates that by June
2004, there were 169,467,393 wireless subscribers within the United States-just under 58%
of the national population. CELLULAR TELECOMM. AND INTERNET ASS'N, CTIA SEMI-
ANNUAL WIRELESS SURVEY 3, at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIAMid-year2004Survey.pdf
(2004); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, supra note 23, at 732
tbl. 1150.
218 The FCC regulates such services as common carriers. See Commercial Mobile Radio
Services, 47 C.F.R. §§20.1-20.20 (2004).
219 This effort is known as Enhanced 911 or E91 1. See In re Revision of the Commis-
sion's Rules To Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling System, Re-
port and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, II FCC Rcd. 18,676 (1996).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Commission's authority to
require cell phone service providers to implement E911 requirements. The court reasoned
that the Federal Aviation Administration does not have to reimburse airlines for the cost of
installing safety equipment. U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
220 See In re Revision of the Commission's Rules To Ensure Compatibility with En-
hanced 911 Emergency Calling System, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 18,676, 18,682, para. 10 (1996).
221 US. Cellular Corp., 254 F.3d at 85.
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the EAS. Estimates suggest that over one-half of Americans currently own a
cellular telephone, many of which are equipped to receive 
text messages.22 2
The capability currently exists where text messages may be delivered to all
cellular telephones physically located within the range of a single cell site
without bringing the system to a complete standstill.
23 Several localities have
already implemented systems, capitalizing on the ability to place first respond-
ers in direct contact with the public through this technology.
2 24 The system
also presents the option of contacting a mobile population that may not be
watching television or listening to the radio as a disaster unfolds.
25
Landline telephony presents another short-term option for communicating
with a large portion of the population. Nearly every home in the United States
has working telephone service and the medium presents an opportunity to
quickly communicate with a significant number of people.
226  The United
Kingdom has already implemented a system developed by British Telecom-
munications that utilizes databases to deliver recorded messages to targeted
portions of the population. 227  The system allows emergency personnel to
phone a centralized calling center, record a message over the phone, and des-
ignate an area where the message should be delivered.
228 Within minutes, tele-
phones throughout the targeted area ring, communicating an important emer-
229gency message.
The FCC should enact regulations 23 ° requiring landline telephone companies
to integrate all customers into the EAS. 3 Customers should be notified upon
signing up with their telephone or wireless service provider that they are auto-
matically enlisted in the program.232 While consumers will ultimately absorb
the costs, such a program should have minimal administrative costs once com-
panies integrate this system into their normal record-keeping process.
222 See supra text accompanying note 217.
223 See Cellular Emergency Alert Sys. Ass'n, at http://www.ceasa.us/faqs.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 4, 2005).
224 See supra text and accompanying note 17.
225 Id.; EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 34-35.
226 Nearly 95% of American households had access to at least one telephone line in
200 1. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, supra note 23, at 721 tbl. 1126.
227 The system is known as Public Warning and Information by Telephone ("PWIT").
See NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, app. H.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 The United Kingdom has enacted legislation called the Data Protection Act that pro-
vides privacy guidelines for consumers' data. See NSCWIP: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note
161, at 21.
23 1 The United Kingdom developed a database to keep track of landline telephone sub-
scribers. See NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, app. H.
232 Id. British Telecommunications maintains a database of all subscribers' information
in the United Kingdom. See NSCWIP: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 161, at 20-21.
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C. Long Term Solutions: Foreseeing the Future
Future technological advances present obvious problems for regulators seek-
ing an up-to-date public warning mechanism. Foresight of coming technologi-
cal advances is difficult to achieve.233 However, it is these technological ad-
vances that may produce opportunities to reach a greater population niche.
The FCC regulates new communications technologies and is in a position to
determine the appropriateness of incorporating the EAS into these new ad-
vances. 34 The Commission must strengthen the EAS by requiring emerging
technologies to implement the system sooner rather than later in order to
achieve a comprehensive system designed to save the most lives and prop-
erty."' The development of satellite television services presents a prime ex-
ample.236 Only broadcasters and cable systems are currently required to carry
EAS messages."' However, over the past decade, satellite television services
have proliferated within a large segment of American society and such services
are not mandated to support EAS capabilities.238 While the FCC currently en-
courages these service providers to participate, mere encouragement is insuffi-
cient.239 Because the agency does not mandate participation, a significant seg-
ment of the population may not receive EAS messages.24
Digital television also presents an innovative mechanism for regulators to
disseminate emergency messages. An estimated 40% of households in the
United Kingdom have access to a digital television set.14 ' The country has
adopted the technology and many households have purchased the sets.242 The
National Steering Committee for Warning and Informing the Public has ex-
plored the capabilities of this technology and determined that it presents a cost
effective means of spreading emergency messages.2 43 Unlike analog sets, digi-
tal television sets may easily be adapted so that regulators may determine the
233 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
234 See id.
235 The Commission has made significant strides towards improving public safety by
mandating Emergency 911 requirements. See In re Revision of the Commission's Rules To
Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling System, Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 1 FCC Rcd. 18,676 (1996).
236 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, supra note 23, at 720
tbl. 1125.
237 In re Review of the Emergency Alert System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19
FCC Rcd. 15,775, 15,779, para. 12 (2004).
238 Id.
239 See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. §11.41 (2004); In re Review of the
Emergency Alert System, 19 FCC Rcd. at 15,776, para. 3.
240 See PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 21.
241 See NSCWIP: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 161, at 18.
242 See NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, at 20.
243 Id. at 18.
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geographic location of each set.244 Additionally, digital television sets can re-
ceive a signal and automatically switch on to deliver a potentially life-saving
emergency message.245 Both the FCC and Congress have endorsed the switch
from analog to digital television within the United States.246 The FCC should
seize this opportunity to configure a comprehensive plan to integrate this tech-
nology into the EAS.
D. Summation: Modernizing the EAS
The key to an effective public warning mechanism is the ability to reach the
largest portion of the population effected by emergency. 47 Integrating certain
features of the United States' telecommunications industry presents perhaps
the most logical and effective method of informing the greatest number of
people.248
The FCC must abandon its policy of merely encouraging participation in the
EAS in favor of a policy of mandatory participation. History has demonstrated
that communication service providers choose not to participate in the EAS a
significant amount of the time unless required to do so.249 In the short-term, the
FCC must work to integrate well-established technologies, such as cell phones
and the Internet, into the EAS. In the long-term, the Commission must antici-
pate the potential proliferation of emerging communications technologies and
determine whether to mandate EAS participation. If the technology presents
the possibility of reaching a broad audience, such as digital television, the FCC
must mandate participation. Otherwise, the FCC should weigh the burden of
requiring private industry participation in the EAS with the potential of saving
lives and preserving property.
V. ISSUES PRESENTED BY LACK OF EDUCATION
Ensuring that an emergency alert reaches a broad range of the population is
only one part of the equation.25 The message must also be effective and must
244 Id. at 20-21.
245 McConnell, supra note 14, at 1, 34. The United Kingdom is currently experimenting
with utilizing digital television to deliver geographically-targeted emergency communica-
tions. NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, at 20-2 1.
246 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §309(j)(14)(A) (2000).
247 See EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 6.
248 Id.
249 Only broadcasters and cable systems actively participate in the EAS. FCC regulations
require such participation. See Emergency Alert System (EAS), 47 C.F.R. §11.41 (2004).
Statistics indicate that these entities may not carry messages unless required to do so. PPW:
EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 11.
250 See EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 9.
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result in appropriate action on the part of individuals who receive the mes-
sage."' Otherwise, the purpose of an emergency warning system is under-
mined. 52
Additionally, the participants in the system must be knowledgeable about
the technological aspects of activating and dispersing messages.253 The EAS is
a largely automated system,254 yet emergency managers and first responders
still need to be educated about properly accessing the EAS via designated entry
points. 55
A. Educating the American Public and EAS Participants
A widespread lack of EAS funding has resulted in inconsistent implementa-
tion of the system on the state and local levels.256 Without providing adequate
training to individuals, such as emergency managers and first responders, who
will access the system, the EAS is less likely to be utilized properly and
timely.257
Currently, no federal entity specifically funds training for EAS equipment
uses and activations.258 While the Society of Broadcast Engineers259 ("SBE")
has attempted to fill this void by providing training for members of SECC's
and LECC's at SBE events, the organization does not have a budget for other
EAS support.26 ° Currently, SECCs and LECCs consist of voluntary partici-
pants from government, emergency services, and industry.' While these indi-
viduals may develop EAS State or Local Area Plans, they may not necessarily
251 Id. at 18.
252 Id. at 9.
253 See P'SHIP FOR PUB. WARNING, COMMENTS CONCERNING THE FCC REVIEW OF THE
EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM 27 at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?na-
tive orpdf=pdf&id document=-6516782571 (Oct. 25, 2004) [hereinafter COMMENTS CON-
CERNING THE FCC REVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM].
254 See generally PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 13, 42-44.
255 COMMENTS CONCERNING THE FCC REVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM, supra
note 253, at 27.
256 See MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 16; PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note
15, at 26.
257 MSRC: FINAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 10; see also Emergency Warning Systems:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emergency Preparedness and Response of the House
Select Comm. on Homeland Sec., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Frank M. Lucia, Mem-
ber, Public Communications and Safety Working Group, Media Security and Reliability
Council), at http://hsc.house.gov/files/Festimony%20Lucia.doc (Sept. 22, 2004).
258 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 24-25.
259 The Society of Broadcast Engineers maintains an EAS Committee which also pro-
vides support to broadcasters. See generally Soc'y of Broad. Eng'rs, at
http://www.sbe.org/eas/eas.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
260 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 25.
261 Id. at 16.
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understand how the system functions. 62 No federal funding exists for mem-
bers of these committees or media outlets who may wish to disseminate an
EAS message."' While the SBE has attempted to fill this void by training
members of the media, SECCs, and LECCs, the program is not mandatory and
is threatened by a general lack of funding.2" The SBE provides a robust EAS
training program, yet the organization receives no federal support and only
allots a small budget for these activities and training.265
FEMA must take an active role in coordinating and educating participants in
the EAS. The agency has both the statutory authority and the responsibility to
do so.266 FEMA currently coordinates emergency response on the federal,
state, and local levels and provides training courses for interested parties
267 in
addition to publishing materials regarding emergency operations planning.
268
However, FEMA does not have a training course or publication specifically
dealing with EAS. FEMA must remedy this omission and integrate EAS acti-
vation information into current educational programs sponsored by the
agency.269
The EAS will not succeed as a public warning mechanism unless system ac-
tivation results in proper action on the part of the message recipient. The
United Kingdom's National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing
the Public has undertaken extensive exploration of education issues related to
public warning."' The group discovered a general lack of awareness within the
country's citizenry as to an appropriate course of action during an emergency
situation. 7 ' As a result, the group produced a video entitled "Go In, Stay In,
Tune In" targeted at the nation's youth.272 The video is based on the idea that
262 See id.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 25.
265 PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 25.
266 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §312(5) (2000). The Homeland Secu-
rity Act of 2002 requires the Under Secretary to "establish training and equipment stan-
dards, provide resource grants, and encourage intelligence and information sharing among
federal agencies, state emergency management officials, and local first responders..." S.
REP. No. 107-175, at 25 (2002). FEMA's Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate
has the responsibility of training federal, state, and local entities to "prepare for, respond to,
[and] recover from a broad range of emergencies . Preparedness, Training, and Exer-
cises Directorate, 44 C.F.R. §2.42(b)(3) (2004).
267 For more information on these training programs, see U.S. Fire Administration, at
http://training.fema.gov (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
268 This guide briefly mentions the EAS. See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY, STATE AND LOCAL GUIDE (SLG) 101: GUIDE FOR ALL-HAZARD EMERGENCY OP-
ERATIONS PLANNING, at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/slgl01.pdf (Sept. 1996).
269 See U.S. Fire Admin., at http://training.fema.gov (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
270 NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, at 13.
271 See id. at 13.
272 According to the National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the Pub-
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when there is danger outside, people should congregate inside their homes.273
Once people are inside their homes, the government may then communicate
with them as to what further action to take.274 The Public Education Group
recommended that the "Go In, Stay In, Tune In" video be expanded to cover an
entire campaign of literature and other materials which could be distributed to
the public.275
FEMA's mandate does not extend to the creation of a public education cam-
paign of this nature.276 In the United States, FEMA could petition a pub-
lic/private partnership or non-profit organization to develop a comprehensive
advertising campaign targeted toward educating the American public about the
EAS. 2" Working with the Advertising Council ("Ad Council"), a non-profit
organization, provides the best option for this type of promotion. The Ad
Council works with other non-profit or government entities to develop adver-
tising campaigns in the public interest.278 The Ad Council solicits marketing
firms to donate pro bono services... and has been the driving force behind sev-
eral widely recognized public interest campaigns from the past fifty years such
as Smokey the Bear, McGruff the Crime Dog, and Rosie the Riveter.28°
Through this cost effective method, FEMA may help initiate a public educa-
tion campaign backed by an entity with a history of developing effective public
service advertisements.
B. Summation: Overcoming Educational Obstacles
The United Kingdom's reliance on educating the nation's youth regarding
lic's Public Education Group, youth aged seven to eleven years old tend to be more "im-
pressionable at developing safety lessons for life." Further, the group believes that these
young people are prone to relaying these safety messages to their parents and family mem-
bers. NSCWIP: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 161, at 31; see also NSCWIP: INTERIM RE-
PORT, supra note 161, at 13-15 (summarizing the Public Education Group's national educa-
tion strategy).
273 See NSCWIP: INTERIM REPORT, supra note 161, at 14.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 16.
276 See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §312(5) (2000 & Supp. 11
2002); Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §5196
(2000) (listing the functions and duties of FEMA); 42 U.S.C. §5196(g).
277 The Partnership for Public Warning recommends the development of a comprehen-
sive public service announcement campaign in order to educate the public of the role of the
EAS as a public warning mechanism. PPW: EAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 15, at 31.
278 See Adver. Council, at http://www.adcouncil.org/about/faq (last visited Nov. 4,
2004).
279 Each Ad Council campaign has a subject expert that provides funds for distribution
and production costs. Id.
280 ADVER. COUNCIL, MATTERS OF CHOICE: ADVERTISING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, at
http://www.adcouncil.org/pdf/matters-of choice.pdf (2002).
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public warnings is well placed. By instructing children of an impressionable
age of preventative actions to take during an emergency, the chances of retain-
ing this pertinent knowledge increases over a long period of time. Further,
these young people are likely to relay lessons learned to other individuals
within their social circles. 28 FEMA could strengthen the effectiveness of the
EAS by incorporating this strategy into its duty to coordinate emergency sys-
tems among the many levels of government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tragedy of September I I demonstrated the need for an effective public
warning mechanism spanning a broad range of technologies. Had the capabili-
ties been in place at the time, first responders and emergency managers at the
scene of the World Trade Center could have activated the EAS and forwarded
text messages calling for an evacuation to all cell phones located within the
area. This type of implementation may have saved the lives of those people
awaiting rescue below the impact zone and the first responders attempting to
reach them.282
The primary obstacle confronting the EAS is the lack of clearly defined
roles among participants on the federal, state, local, and industry level. The
current cooperative federalism structure for implementing the system is ideal
because it allows the federal government to specify standards to be utilized
throughout the country, while giving states and localities the flexibility to mod-
ify the system as they see fit. Despite this ideal structure, the many players
must strengthen their roles in administering the system, particularly on the fed-
eral level. As the agency at the forefront of communications technologies, the
FCC is well positioned to meet the challenges of incorporating the EAS into
emerging technologies that will proliferate throughout our society. FEMA
must also strengthen its role in coordinating the EAS among participants in the
system. By adopting the United Kingdom's concept of regional coordinators,
FEMA may provide guidance to states and localities to increase communica-
tion regarding the system among the different levels of government.
The failure to require EAS participation in newer, well-established tech-
nologies impedes the effectiveness of the EAS. Although the evolving tele-
communications industry within the United States presents innovative oppor-
tunities for regulators to warn the public during an emergency, the FCC has
failed to capitalize on these prospects. The FCC must adopt a stronger stance
in requiring technologies that will or have already proliferated our society, to
281 NSCWIP: PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 161, at 3 1.
282 See EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS, supra note 13, at 13.
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participate in the EAS. Merely encouraging participation does not provide the
level of certainty needed in a system designed to keep the nation secure.
Finally, the federal government, especially FEMA, must ensure that EAS
messages are properly disseminated by developing and undertaking a compre-
hensive educational campaign. FEMA must confront how to best educate
broadcasters and other entities that own EAS equipment. Additionally, FEMA
should also seek to educate the nation's public, particularly the youth, regard-
ing the national public warning system. A minimal amount of training will
increase the chances that a recipient of an EAS message will take proper ac-
tion.2"3 As a result, lives will be saved and property will be preserved.
283 Id at 18.
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